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SUMMARY:

~gulate

Whether New Mexico has concurrent jurisdiction

hunting and fishing by nontribal members on resp's

Indian reservation.
2.

FACTS & DECISION BELOW:

Resp Tribe has adopted a

comprehensive scheme of laws to regulate hunting and fishing on
its reservation.

These tribal ordinances were adopted pursuant

to the tribal constitution and were duly approved by the
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Secretary of the Interior.

/

The ordinances conflict with state

game laws in several respects.

Most importantly, the tribal
~·

I l

ordinances specifically allow nonmembers to hunt and fish on its
reservation without a state license.

-

Also, tribal hunting

~seasons and bag limits do not correspond with those of the state.
The Tribe has erected a resort complex, and many nonmember

sportsmen come to the reservation to hunt and fish.

The revenue

the Tribe garners from these sportsmen comprises a significant
portion of the tribal budget.
The Tribe has worked closely with the federal government to
create and preserve wildlife resources.

Several man-made lakes

have been constructed with federal funds and are stocked from a
national fish hatchery on the reservation.

Moreover, with

federal assistance, the Tribe has built up a substantial elk
-----~

herd.

The federal government also provides other forms of

assistance to the Tribe.

New Mexico has stipulated that tribal

management of reservation wildlife resources has been exemplary,
and in conformance with accepted wildlife management procedures.
Although at one time New Mexico also provided the Tribe with
considerable assistance, such as training of tribal conservation
officers, and stocking of streams on the reservation, state
involvement with the Tribe's wildlife program began to diminish
in 1969, and is now virtually nonexistent.

Although the state

once enforced its wildlife laws and regulations on the
reservation against nontribal members, the Tribe has now told the
state that its fish and game officers are not welcome on the
reservation without permission.

-3The present controversy apparently erupted when the state
threatened to arrest nonmembers for hunting on the reservation
during one of the Tribe's big game seasons, which began prior to
the state's season.

~ecured

Th ~ribe

filed suit in D. N. Mex. and

a judgment declaring that the state may not apply its

hunting and fishing laws to any person within the boundaries of
the tribal reservation.

The DC also enjoined the state from

enforcing its game laws against any person either on the
reservation or off the reservation for acts done on the
reservation.

~

10 affirmed.

Relying alternatively on federal preemption

and tribal self-government grounds, see White Mountain Apache

(

Tribe v. Bracker, 448
~Tribe

u.s.

136

(1980), CA 10 agreed that the

had the exclusive right to regulate hunting and fishing on

----------------------~

its reservation.

With respect to preemption, CA 10 found that the applicable
treaty and federal statutes, read against the backdrop of Indian

sovereignty, ~ eempted exercise of state power in this case.

The

court first noted the Tribe's inherent authority over wildlife
management, which stems from its traditional reliance on wild
game for basic survival needs.

Furthermore, CA 10 saw a strong

treaty and statutory basis for federal preemption.
relied on:

( 1) the Apache Treaty, 10 Stat. 979

The court

( 18 52) , under

which the Tribe submitted itself "exclusively" to the
jurisdiction and government of the United States:
Mexico Enabling Act, 36 Stat. 557

''·

(2) the New

(1910), in which New Mexico

-4Indian lands were placed "under the absolute jurisdiction and
control" of the United States;
(3) the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 35

u.s.c.

§476, under

which Congress provided that the adoption of a tribal
constitution reconfirms in the tribe "all powers vested
existing law";

• by

(4) the tribal constitution, which gives the Tribe

the power to "protect and preserve the property, wildlife and
natural resources of the Tribe"; (5) the extensive federal
participation in the Tribe's wildlife development program; and
(6) the "negative inferences" from P.L. 280, 67 Stat. 590 (1953),
which until 1968 allowed states the option of unilaterally
asserting civil and criminal jurisdiction over certain Indian
tribes.

Even states that opted to assume jurisdiction could not

deprive the tribes of "any right, privilege, or immunity afforded
under Federal treaty, agreement, or statute with respect to
hunting, trapping, or fishing or the control, licensing, or
regulating thereof."

25

u.s.c.

§132l(b).

Since those states

that opted to accept P.L. 280 jurisdiction were not permitted to
hinder traditional hunting and fishing rights, the court felt
that it

followed~

fortiori that New Mexico, which declined to

accept P.L. 280 jurisdiction, could not do so.
Although recognizing that this Court appears to be gradually
collapsing the preemption and tribal self-government tests into

v?.

one, CA 10 felt that the two tests continue to provide different
analytical prospectives, and, accordingly, it analyzed separately
the propriety of New Mexico's regulations with respect to their
impact on tribal self-government.

The court concluded that, even

-5-

if its federal preemption rationale were insufficient, the DC
would in any event have to be affirmed under a tribal selfgovernment rationale.

The court found a clear state interference

with traditional tribal regulatory power.

The Tribe made a

showing that application of New Mexico's game laws would
materially affect or frustrate the Indians' governance of
themselves or any commercial, conservationist or other program
administered by the Indians for their own advantage.

Congress

has declared that its policy is "to help develop and utilize
Indian resources • . . to a point where the Indians will fully
exercise responsibility for the utilization and management of
their own resources."

25

u.s.c.

§1451.

CA 10 reasoned that if

it were to permit state interference with the tribal regulatory
scheme, it would be effectively denying Indians the opportunity
of developing their own system.
The state then filed for cert in this Court.

We GVR'd for

further consideration in light of Montana v. United States, 450

u.s.

544 (1981).

778, 450

u.s.

New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, No. 80-

1036 (1981).

On remand, CA 10 reinstated its previous decision.

Montana,

----------------'---~~~--'----------

reasoned the Court, dealt only with the right of an Indian tribe
to regulate fishing and hunting by non-Indians on lands within
its reservation owned in fee simple by non-Indians.
547.

450 U.S. at

This case, in contrast, deals with the power of the Tribe

to control, exploit, and regulate trial resources on tribal

J

land. ~~

CA 10 also noted this Court's recent decision in Merrion v.
Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 102 S.Ct. 894 (1982), in which the Court

-6-

held that, under the tribe's general sovereign authority to
control economic activity within its jurisidiction, it could
impose a severance tax on non-Indian mining activities on the
tribe's reservation.

Merrion convinced CA 10 that Montana does

not dictate a result different from that originally reached by
it.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

First, New Mexico argues that CA 10 erred

by dismissing Montana as irrelevant.

The Montana Court stated

that, as a "general proposition," the inherent sovereign powers
of an Indian tribe "do not extend to activities of nonmembers of
the Tribe."

450 U.S. at 565.

Thus, the factual differences

between Montana and this case are completely inconsequential.
Moreover, contrary to CA lO's opinion, Merrion, not Montana, is
irrelevant to the resolution of this case.

Merrion involved only

the question of tribal authority to impose a severance tax; it
did not address whether the state would have concurrent taxing or
regulatory authority.
Second, New Mexico contends that CA lO's decision conflicts
with a number of other cases that have held that a state has
concurrent authority to regulate hunting and fishing by nontribal
members on an Indian reservation.

New Mexico cites White Earth

Band of Chippewa Indians v. Alexander, 683 F.2d 1129 (CA 8 1982);
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Arizona, 649 F.2d 1274 (CA 9
1981); United States v. Montana, 604 F.2d 1162 (CA 9 1979),
reversed on other grounds, 450

u.s.

544 (1981); United States v.

Sanford, 547 F.2d 1085 (CA 9 1976); Montana ex. rel. Nepstad v.
Danielson, 149 Mo. 438, 427 P.2d 689 (1967); and Ex Parte Crosby,

-738 Nev. 389, 149 P. 989 (1915).

Contra, Eastern Band of Cherokee

Indians v. North Carolina Wildlife Resources Comm'n, 588 F.2d 75
(CA 4 1978), cert. dismissed, 446

u.s. 960 (1980).

Third, New Mexico argues at length that CA 10 erred by
finding preemption and infringement of tribal self-government
under the facts of this case.
Resp Tribe counters that CA 10 faithfully performed its duty
on remand and correctly distinguished Montana.

Second, without

discussing the specific cases relied on by New Mexico as showing
a conflict, the Tribe simply asserts that all cases cited by petr
are distinguishable because the tribes in those cases did not do
a good job of preparing an adequate factual foundation in support
of their cases.

Unlike those cases, the tribe here has a "sound

factual foundation."

Third, the Tribe argues that CA lO's

decision is correct on the merits.
An amici brief in support of the petition has been filed on
behalf of eight western states with Indian reservations located
within.

Amici adopt the arguments of New Mexico, and assert that

CA lO's decision, if allowed to stand, will have the potential of
totally disrupting long-established game management programs, and
could divest the states of their sovereign rights to regulate and
control the harvesting of game by non-Indian sportsmen within
their borders.

The deer, elk, and other wildlife migrate back

and forth across reservation boundaries.

The Tribe incorrectly

appears to view this wildlife as tantamount to Indian livestock.
4.

DISCUSSION:

V\~ irrelevant

r~

I believe that both Montana and Merrion are

to this case.

Both of these cases dealt with the

.
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I

tribe's authority to regulate non-Indian conduct on its
reservation.
undisputed.

Here, the Tribe's regulatory authority is
The issue is whether the state has concurrent

jurisdiction to regulate.
The critical Supreme Court decision in this regard is White
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, supra, in which the Court held
that Arizona was preempted from imposing certain taxes on a nonIndian who was cutting timber on an Indian reservation.

We

stated that where "a State asserts authority over the conduct of
non-Indians engaging in activities on the reservation," a court
must make "a particularized inquiry into the nature of the State,
Federal, and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry designed to
determine whether, in the specific context, the exercise of state
authority would violate federal law."

Id. at 144-45.

In finding

preemption under the facts of Bracker, the Court gave particular
weight to the following three factors:
(1) the comprehensive and pervasive federal regulatory scheme for
harvesting and marketing Indian timber left no room for
additional state taxes or

burdens~

(2) the assessment of state

taxes would have obstructed federal policies relating to the
profitability and management of Indian logging

enterprises~

and

(3) there was no regulatory function or service performed by the
state that would justify the assessment of taxes, the general
desire to raise revenue alone being an insufficient justification
for taxation in light of the "significant geographical component
to tribal sovereignty," a factor which, although not absolute, is

-9-

"important" and highly relevant in preemption analysis.

Id. at

145-50.
Applying the Bracker factors to the present case, I think
the outcome is close.

The first Bracker factor is not present

here: there is no "comprehensive and pervasive" federal
regulatory scheme involved.

It arguably could be said, however,

that state regulation in the present context would obstruct
federal policy favoring profitability and self-management of the
Indian hunting and fishing enterprise, and it arguably can be
said that the state is no longer performing regulatory functions
or services on the reservation with respect to wildlife that
would justify its assertion of jurisdiction over this matter.
The present facts seem closer to those of Bracker than to those
of Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134 (1980), in
which the Court upheld a state's assertion of concurrent taxing
authority over cigarette sales to non-Indians on a reservation.
New Mexico correctly points out that CA lO's decision
conflicts with other cases that have upheld state authority to
regulate hunting and fishing by nontribal members on an Indian
reservation.

In White Earth Band, supra, a post-Bracker

decision, CA 8 held that Minnesota had concurrent jurisdiction to
subject non-Indians hunting or fishing on tribal lands to
licensing regulations.

It is true that White Earth Band is

perhaps factually distinguishable: CA 8 held simply that the
Indians had not met their "burden of showing that the state's
gaming laws were unreasonable and unrelated to its regulatory
authority."

683 F.2d at 1138.

-10CA lO's decision also conflicts with CA 9's pre-Bracker

------7

opinions in United States v. Montana, supra, and United States v.
Sanford, supra.

However, White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Arizona,

supra, CA 9's most recent and only post-Bracker pronouncement on
this subject, essentially is in accord with CA 10.

While

rejecting the argument that state regulation was barred on tribal
self-government grounds, CA 9 intimated that state regulation
might be preempted.

In White Mountain, CA 9 consolidated two DC

decisions, one of which had granted a preliminary injunction in
favor of the Indians, and the other of which granted summary
judgment against the Indians.

Without deciding the merits of

either case, CA 9 affirmed the grant of a preliminary injunction
in the former case, and vacated the summary judgment and remanded
the latter case for further consideration in light of Bracker.
The remaining cases cited by New Mexico are all pre-Bracker,
as is Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. North Carolina Wildlife
Resources Comm'n, supra, a CA 4 decision essentially in accord
with CA 10.
Although all of these cases are slightly different
factually, the

~erlying

legal issue seems sufficiently

important and recurring to warrant a grant.
should be most interesting and helpful.

The views of the SG

According to footnote 4

of petr's brief, the Department of the Interior in 1971 issued a
formal opinion advising that nontribal members could be subjected
to state game laws on an Indian reservation.

78 I.D. 101 (1971).

The opinion was withdrawn without explanation in 1976.
I recommend CVSG, with a view towards a grant.

-11There is a response, and one amici brief.
October 27, 1982
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You indicated that annotation of the pool memo would be sufficient in this case.

I am in agreement with the memo writer and re-

main comfortable with my views expressed earlier.

I vmuld affirm.

The most relevant case for analytical purposes seems to be
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448

u.s.

136 (lq80)

(w/POW-

ELL, J.)
State asserts authority over the conduct of non-Indians engaging in
an activity on the reservation," what is called for is "a particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and tribal
interests at stake, an inquiry designed to determine whether, in the
specific context, the exercise of state authority would violate federal law."

Id., at 144-145.

The Court indicated that" [i]n such

cases we have examined the language of the relevant federal treaties
and statutes in terms of both the broad policies that underlie them
and the notions of sovereignty that have developed from historical
traditions of tribal independence."

Id.

It is difficult to say that federal law will be violated directly by concurrent state jurisdiction.
however, six sources of federal

The CAlO has identified, ,9oo;

reemption, which, I think,

read with due consideration for tribal sovereignty, counsel
for a conclusion that state authority is foreclosed.

~

w~

s~fo~

It seems clear

to me that since the Treaty of July 1, 1852 that the United States

' v

has viewed the power to control hunting and fishing in the area in
which the Apaches reside to be reserved.

I

~~

NM's enabling act would

confirm this reservation, and the fact that Public Law 280, any

2•

benefits of which NM has not elected to assume, specifically protects the tribes from the deprivation of "any right, privilege, or
statute with respect to hunting, trapping, or fishing or the control, licensing, or regulating thereof," 25

u.s.c.

§132l(b}, makes

it difficult for the State not to acknowledge federal preemption.
Moreover, 18

u.s.c.

§1165 provides for a criminal fine to be imposed

on anyone hunting, fishing, or trapping on tribal trust land without
tribal permission.
Although the Tribal wildlife regulations are not
a pure feneral
......._
regulatory scheme, I believe that they operate in a similar effect
because of Congress' ability to preempt the Tribe's power.

In any

case, the Tribe's cons
vasive."

I am inclined to think that "no room remains for state

laws imposing additional burdens," and that the superimposition of
state regulation "could •.• disturb and disarrange" the federally approved plan.

u.s.

Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Commission, 380

6 8 5' 6 9 0 ' 6 91 ( 19 6 5} .
At the moment, there is very little regulatory function or

service performed on the Reservation by the State, and there is no
------~---~
----------------~'---------

.

~

~ n ~d

~~

justifying concurrent jurisdiction.

Moreover,

.. hatever state interest there is seems relatively insignificant when
compared with the interests of the Tribe in exploiting the resources
that the reservation offers.

-

I find interesting the SG's assertion

that "absent special Congressional consent or clear necessity, we
are not aware that this Court has ever condoned a State attempt to
regulate the activities of non-Indians in their intercourse with a
Tribe on tribal Reservation lands."
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES
No. 82--331

NEW MEXICO, ET AL., PETITIONER v. MESCALERO
APACHE TRIBE
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
[May-, 1983]

JUSTICE MARSHALL, delivered the opinion of the Court.
We are called upon to decide in this case whether a State
may restrict an Indian Tribe's regulation of hunting and fishing on its reservation. With extensive federal assistance
and supervision, the Mescalero Apache Tribe has established
a comprehensive scheme to regulate hunting and fishing
within its reservation. Federally approved Tribal ordinances regulate in detail the conditions under which both
members of the Tribe and nonmembers may hunt and fish.
New Mexico seeks to apply its own laws to hunting and fishing by nonmembers on the reservation. We hold that this
application of New Mexico's hunting and fishing laws is preempted by the operation of federal law.
I
The Mescalero Apache Tribe (Tribe) resides on a reservation located within Otero County in south central New Mexico. The reservation, which represents only a small portion
of the aboriginal Mescalero domain, was created by a succession of Executive Orders promulgated in the 1870's and
1880's. 1 The present reservation comprises more than
See 1 C. Klapper, Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties 870--873 (1904).
The final boundaries were fixed by the Executive Order of Mar. 24, 1883
1

);LI<

~-

~~
~

~

1-& Tf11

rl5/zt;
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460,000 acres, of which the Tribe owns all but 193.85 acres. 2
Approximately 2,000 members of the Tribe reside on the reservation, along with 179 non-Indians, including resident federal employees of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Indian
Health Service.
The Tribe is organized under the Indian Reorganization
Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984, 25 U. S. C. § 461 et seq.,
which authorizes any tribe residing on a reservation to adopt
a constitution and bylaws, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary). The Tribe's Constitution,
which was approved by the Secretary on January 12, 1965,
requires the Tribal Council
"[t]o protect and preserve the property, wildlife and natural resources of the tribe, and to regulate the conduct of
trade and the use and disposition of tribal property upon
the reservation, providing that any ordinance directly affecting non-members of the tribe shall be subject to review by the Secretary of Interior." App. 53.
The Constitution further provides that the Council shall
"adopt and approve plans of operation to govern the conduct of any business or industry that will further the economic well-being of the members of the tribe, and to undertake any activity not inconsistent with Federal law or
(Order of President Arthur). Portions of the reservation were briefly included in a National Forest, but were restored to the Mescalero reservation by the Executive Order of Feb. 17, 1912 (Order of President Taft).
An intervening Executive Order of Mar. 1, 1910, issued by President Taft
exempted from the reservation two "small holdings claims" covering settlements located before the establishment of the reservation. The Tribe has
since purchased all but 23.8 acres of the land covered by these claims.
2
These lands comprise the 23.8 acres remaining of the "small holdings
claims," see note 1, supra; 10 acres granted to St. Joseph's Catholic Church
by the Act of Mar. 29, 1928, ch. 299, 45 Stat. 1716; and the unimproved and
unoccupied 160 acre "Dodson Tract" in the northwest portion of the reservation. See Brief for United States 2 n. 3.

82-331-0PINION
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with this constitution, designed for the social or economic improvement of the Mescalero Apache people,
... subject to review by the Secretary of the Interior."
Ibid.
Anticipating a decline in the sale of lumber which has been
the largest income-producing activity within the reservation,
the Tribe has recently committed substantial time and resources to the development of other sources of income. The
Tribe has constructed a resort complex financed principally
by federal funds, 8 and has undertaken a substantial development of the reservation's hunting and fishing resources.
These efforts provide employment opportunities for members of the Tribe, and the sale of hunting and fishing licenses
and related services generate)ncome which is used to main- - S
tain the Tribal government and provide services to Tribe
members. 4
Development of the reservation's fish and wildlife resources has involved a sustained, cooperative effort by the
Tribe and the Federal Government. Indeed, the reservation's fishing resources are wholly attributable to these recent efforts. Using federal funds, the Tribe has established
3

Financing for the complex, the Inn of Mountain Gods, came principally
from the Economic Development Administration (EDA), an agency of the
United States Department of Commerce, and other federal sources. In
addition, the Tribe obtained a $6 million loan from the Bank of New Mexico, 90% of which was guaranteed by the Secretary of the Interior under
the Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U. S. C. §§ 1451-1543, and 10% of
which was guaranteed by Tribal funds. Certain additional facilities at the
Inn were completely funded by the EDA as public works projects, and
other facilities received 50% funding from the EDA. Appendix to Brief in
Opposition 7a--8a.
4
Income from the sale of hunting and fishing licenses, "package hunts"
which combine hunting and fishing with use of the facilities at the Inn, and
campground and picnicking permits totalled $269,140 in 1976 and $271,520
in 1977. The vast majority of the nonmember hunters and fishermen on
the reservation are not residents of the State of New Mexico.

82-331-0PINION
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eight artificial lakes which, together with the reservation's
streams, are stocked by the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and
Wildlife of the the U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service,
Deparment of the Interior, which operates a federal hatchery
located on the reservation. None of the waters are stocked
by the State. 5 The United States has also contributed substantially to the creation of the reservation's game resources.
Prior to 1966 there were only 13 elk in the vicinity of the reservation. In 1966 and 1967 the National Park Service donated a herd of 162 elk which was released on the reservation. Through its management and range development 6 the
Tribe has dramatically increased the elk population, which by
1977 numbered approximately 1,200. New Mexico has not
contributed significantly to the development of the elk herd
or the other game on the reservation, which includes antelope, bear and deer. 7
The Tribe and the Federal Government jointly conduct a
comprehensive fish and game management program. Pursuant to its Constitution and to an agreement with the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, 8 the Tribal Council
adopts hunting and fishing ordinances each year. The tribal
ordinances, which establish bag limits and seasons and provide for licensing of hunting and fishing, are subject to ap• The State has not stocked any waters on the reservation since 1976.
6
These efforts have included controlling and reducing the population of
other animals, such as wild horses and cattle, which compete for the available forage on the reservation.
7
The New Mexico Department Game and Fish issued a permit for the
importation of the~k from Wyoming into New Mexico. The Department has provided the Tribe with any management assistance which the
Tribe has requested; such requests have been limited. Appendix to Brief
in Opposition 16a.
8
That agreement, which provides for the stocking of the reservation's
artificallakes by the Bureau, obligates the Tribe to "designate those waters of the reservation which shall be open to public fishing" and "to establish regulations for the conservation of fishery resources."

,_
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proval by the Secretary under the Tribal Constitution and
have been so approved. The Tribal Council adopts the game
ordinances on the basis of recommendations submitted by a
Bureau of Indian Affairs range conservationist who is assisted by full-time conservation officers employed by the
Tribe. The recommendations are made in light of the conservation needs of the reservation, which are detennined on
the basis of annual game counts and surveys. Through the
Bureau of Fish and Wildlife, the Secretary also detennines
the stocking of the reservation's waters based upon periodic
surveys of the reservation.
Numerous conflicts exist between State and tribal hunting
regulations. 9 For instance, tribal seasons and bag limits for
both hunting and fishing often do not coincide with those imposed by the State. The Tribe pennits a hunter to kill both
a buck and a doe; the State pennits only buck to be killed.
Unlike the State, the Tribe pennits a person to purchase an
elk license in two consecutive years. Moreover, since 1977,
the Tribe's ordinances have specified that State hunting and
fishing licenses are not required for Indians or non-Indians
who hunt or fish on the reservation. 10 The New Mexico Department of Game and Fish has enforced the State's regulations by arresting non-Indian hunters for illegal possession of
game killed on the reservation in accordance with tribal ordinances but not in accordance with State hunting regulations.
In 1977 the Tribe filed suit against the State and the Director of its Fish and Game Department in the United States
District Court for the District of New Mexico, seeking to prevent the State from regulating on-reservation hunting or
These conflicts have persisted despite the parties' stipulation that the
New Mexico State Game Commission has attempted to "accomodate the
preferences of the Mescalero Apache Tribe and other Indian tribes." Appendix to Brief in Opposition 25a.
10
Prior to 1977 the Tribe consented to the application to the reservation
of the State's hunting and fishing regulations.
9
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fishing by members or nonmembers. On August 2, 1978, the
District Court ruled in favor of the Tribe and granted declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of the
State's hunting and fishing laws against any person for hunting and fishing activities conducted on the reservation. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 630 F. 2d 724 (1980). Following New Mexico's petition for a writ of certiorari, this Court vacated the Tenth
Circuit's judgment, 450 U. S. 1036 (1981), and remanded the
case for reconsideration in light of Montana v. United States,
450 U. S. 544 (1981). On remand, the Court of Appeals adhered to its earlier decision. 677 F. 2d 55 (1982). We
granted certiorari, - - U. S. - - (1982), and we now
affirm.
II
New Mexico concedes that within the reservation the Tribe
exercises exclusive jurisdiction over hunting and fishing by
members of the Tribe and may also regulate the hunting and
fishing by nonmembers. 11 New Mexico contends, however,
that it may exercise concurrent jurisdiction over nonmembers and that therefore its regulations governing hunting and
fishing throughout the State should also apply to hunting and
fishing by nonmembers on the reservation. Although New
Mexico does not claim that it can require the Tribe to pennit
nonmembers to hunt and fish on the reservation, it claims
that, once the Tribe chooses to pennit hunting and fishing by
nonmembers, such hunting and fishing is subject to any
State-imposed conditions. Under this view the State would
be free to impose conditions more restrictive than the Tribe's
own regulations, including an outright prohibition. The
question in this case is whether the State may so restrict the
Tribe's exercise of its authority.
Our decision in Montana v. United States, supra, does not
resolve this question. Unlike this case, Montana concerned
11

Brief for Petitioner 7, 12, 20; Tr. of Oral Arg. 7.
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lands located within the reservation but not owned by the
Tribe or its members. We held that the Crow Tribe could
not as a general matter regulate hunting and fishing on those
lands. 450 U. S., at 557--567. 12 But as to "lands belonging
to the Tribe or held by the United States in trust for the
Tribe," we "readily agree[ d)" that a Tribe may "prohibit nonmembers from hunting or fishing . . . [or] condition their entry by charging a fee or establish bag and creel limits." Id.,
at 557. We had no occasion to decide whether a Tribe may
only exercise this authority in a manner permitted by a
State.
On numerous occasions this Court has considered the question whether a State may assert authority over a reservation.
The decision in Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 561 (1832),
reflected the view that Indian tribes were wholly distinct nations within whose boundaries "the laws of [a State] can have
no force." We long ago departed from the "conceptual clarity of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall's view in Worcester," Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S. 145, 148 (1973), and
have acknowledged certain limitations on tribal sovereignty.
For instance, we have held that Indian tribes have been implicitly divested of their sovereignty in certain respects by
virtue of their dependent status, 13 that under certain circumstances a State may validly assert authority over the activiEven so, the Court acknowledged that "Indian tribes retain inherent
sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands." 450 U. S., at
565. The Court stressed that in Montana the pleadings "did not allege
that non-Indian hunting and fishing on [non-Indian] reservation lands [had]
impaired [the Tribe's reserved hunting and fishing privileges]," id., at 558
n.6, or "that non-Indian hunting and fishing on fee lands imperil the subsis- a..tence or welfare of the Tribe," id., at 566, and that the existing record ~
failed to suggested "that such non-Indian hunting and fishing ... threaten
the Tribe's political or economic security," ibid.
13
See, e. g., Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U. S. 661,
6?7--&>8 (1974); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U. S. 191 (1978).
12
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ties of nonmembers on a reservation, 14 and that in exceptional
circumstances a State may assert jurisdiction over the onreservation activities of tribal members. 15
Nevertheless, in demarcating the respective spheres of
State and tribal authority over Indian reservations, we have
continued to stress that "Indian tribes are unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their
members and their territory," White Mountain Apache Tribe
v. Bracker, 448 U. S. 136, 142 (1980), quoting United States
v. Mazurie, 419 U. S. 544, 557 (1975). Because of their sovereign status, tribes and their reservation lands are insulated
by an "historic immunity from state and local control," M escalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S. 145, 152 (1973), and
tribes retain any aspect of their historical sovereignty not
"inconsistent with the overriding interests of the National
Government." Washington v. Confederated Tribes, supra,
at 153.
The sovereignty retained by tribes includes "the power of
regulating their internal and social relations," United States
v. Kagama, 118 U. &. 375, 381--382 (1886), cited in United
States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S. 313, 322 (1978). A tribe's
power to presribe the conduct of tribal members has never
been doubted, and our cases establish that a State may not
assert its authority over the activities of members on a resSee, e. g., Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134 (1980);
Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U. S. 463 (1976).
16
See Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Game Dept., 433 U.S. 165 (1977).
Puyallup upheld the State of Washington's authority to regulate on-reservation fishing by tribal members. Like Montana v. United States,
supra, the decision in Puyallup rested in part on the fact that the dispute
centered on lands which, although located within the reservation boundaries, no longer belonged to the tribe; all but 22 of the 18,000 acres had
been alienated in fee simple. The Court also relied on a provision of the
Indian treaty which qualified the Indians' fishing rights by requiring that
they be exercised "in common with all citizens of the Territory," id., 175,
and on the State's interest in conserving a scarce, common resource.
Id., at 174, 175-177.
14
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ervation in the absence of express tribal consent or congressional grant. See Fisher v. District Court, 424 U. S. 382,
388-389 (1976)(per curiam); McClanahan v. Arizona Stae
Tax Comm'n, 411 U. S. 164, 171 (1973); Mescalero Apache
Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S. 145, 148 (1973). See also Williams
v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217, 222 (1959).
A tribe's power to exclude nonmembers entirely or to condition their presence on the reservation is equally well established. See, e. g., Montana v. United States, supra;
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U. S. 130 (1982).
Whether a State may also assert its authority over the onreservation activities of nonmembers raises "[m]ore difficult
questions," Bracker, supra, at 144. While under some circumstances a State may exercise concurrent jurisdiction over
non-Indians acting on tribal reservations, see, e. g., Washington v. Confederated Tribes, supra; Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U. S. 463 (1976), such authority may be asserted only if not preempted by the operation of federal law.
See, e. g., Ramah Navajo School Bd., supra; White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, supra; Central Machinery Co.
v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 448 U. S. 160 (1980); Williams v.
Lee, 358 U. S. 217 (1959); Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U. S. 685 (1965); Fisher v. District
Court, supra; Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, 400
u. s. 423 (1971).
In Bracker we reviewed our prior decisions concerning
tribal and State authority over Indian reservations and extracted certain principles governing the determination
whether federal law preempts the assertion of State authority over nonmembers on a reservation. We stated that that
determination does not depend "on mechanical or absolute
conceptions of state or tribal sovereignty, but calls for a particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and
tribal interests at stake." 448 U. S., at 145.
We also emphasized the special sense in which the doctrine
of preemption is applied in this context. See id., at 143-144;
Ramah Navajo School Bd., supra,-- U. S., at--. AI-
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though a State will certainly be without jurisdiction if its authority is preempted under familiar principles of preemption, e we cautioned that our prior cases did not limit pre/emption of
State laws affecting Indian tribes to only those circumstances. "The unique historical origins of tribal sovereignty" and the federal commitment to tribal self-sufficiency
and self-determination make it "treacherous to import . . .
.9 notions of prejemption that are properly applied to other contexts." Bracker, supra, at 143. See also Ramah Navajo
School Bd., supra, at - - . By resting preemption analysis
principally on a consideration of the nature of the competing
interests at stake, our cases have rejected a narrow focus on
congressional intent to preempt State law as the sole touchstone. They have also rejected the proposition that preemption requires "an express congressional statement to that effect." Bracker, supra, at 144 (footnote omitted). State
jurisdiction is preempted by the operation of federal law if it
interferes or is incompatible with federal and tribal interests
reflected in federal law, unless the State interests at stake
are sufficient to justify the assertion of State authority.
Bracker, supra, at 145. See also Ramah Navajo School
Bd., supra, at-, quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S.
52, 67 (1941). 16
Certain broad considerations guide our assessment of the
federal and tribal interests. The traditional notions of Indian sovereignty provide a crucial "backdrop," Bracker,
supra, at 143, citing McClanahan, supra, at 172, against
which any assertion of State authority must be assessed.
16
The exercise of State authority may also be barred by an independent
barrier-inherent tribal sovereignty-if it "unlawfully infringe[s] 'on the
right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them."
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U. S., at 142, quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217, 220 (1959). See also Washington v. Yakima
Indian Nation, 439 U. S. 463, 502 (1979); Fisher v. District Court, 424
U. S. 382 (1976) (per curiam); Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, 400
U. S. 423 (1971)." 448 U. S., at 142-143.
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Moreover, both the tribes and the Federal Government are
firmly committed to the goal of promoting tribal self-government, a goal embodied in numerous federal statutes. 17 We
have stressed that Congress' objective of furthering tribal
self-government encompasses far more than encouraging
tribal management of disputes between members, but includes Congress' overriding goal of encouraging tribes "to assume control over their 'business and economic affairs,'"
Bracker, supra, at 149, citing Mescalero Apache Tribe v.
Jones, 411 U. S., at 151. In part as a necessary implication
of this broad federal commitment, we have held that tribes
have the power to manage the use of its territory and resources by both members and nonmembers, 18 Merrion,
supra, at 137; Bracker, supra, at 151; Montana v. United
17

For example, the Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U. S. C. § 1451 et
seq., states: "It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress ... to help
develop and utilize Indian resources, both physical and human, to a point
where the Indians will fully exercise responsibility for the utilization and
management of their own resources and where they will enjoy a standard
of living from their own productive efforts comparable to that enjoyed by
non-Indians in neighboring communities." § 1451. Similar policies underlie the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, 25
U. S. C. § 450 et seq., as well as the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25
U. S. C. § 461 et seq., pursuant to which the Mescalero Apache Tribe
adopted its Constitution. The "intent and purpose of the Reorganization
Act was 'to rehabilitate the Indian's economic life and to give him a chance
to develop the initiative destroyed by a century of oppression and paternalism.'" Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S., at 152, quoting H. R.
Rep. No. 1804, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1934). The Indian Civil Rights Act
of 1968, 25 U. S. C. § 1301 et seq., likewise reflects Congress' intent "to
promote the well-established federal 'policy of furthering Indian self-government.'" Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U. S. 49, 62 (1978),
quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 551 (1974).
18
Our cases have recognized that tribal sovereignty contains a "significant geographical component." Bracker, supra, at 151. Thus the off-reservation activities of Indians are generally subject to the prescriptions of a
"nondiscriminatory state law" in the absence of "express federal law to the
contrary.'' Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S., at 148-149.
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States, supra; 28 U. S. C. § 1162(b); 25 U. S. C. §§ 1321(b),
1322(b); 18 U. S. C. § 1165, to undertake and regulate economic activity within the reservation, Merrion, supra, at
137, and to defray the cost of governmental services by levying taxes. Ibid. Thus, when a tribe undertakes an enterprise under the authority of federal law, an assertion of State
authority is preempted to the extent that it "threaten[s] the
overriding federal objective" of promoting "tribal self-sufficiency and economic development." Bracker, supra, at 149,
143 (footnote omitted). See also Ramah Navajo School Bd.,
supra, at--, quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67
(1941) (State authority precluded when it "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress").
Our prior decisions also guides our assessment of the state
interest asserted to justify State jurisdiction over a reservation. The exercise of State authority which imposes additional burdens on a tribal enterprise must ordinarily be justified by functions or services performed by the State in
connection with the on-reservation activity. Ramah Navajo
School Bd., supra, at - - & note 7; Bracker, supra, at
148-149; Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n,
448 U. S. 160, 174 (1980) (POWELL, J., concurring). Thus a
State seeking to impose a tax on a transaction between a
Tribe and nonmembers must point to more than its general
interest in raising revenues. See, e. g., Warren Trading
Post Co., supra; Bracker, supra; Ramah Navajo School Bd.,
supra. A State seeking not merely to tax but to regulate a
tribal activity is under a greater burden to advance a significant State interest, since duplicative and potentially conflicting regulation is generally more disruptive than double taxation. Cf. Confederated Tribes, supra, at 159. A State's
regulatory interest will be particularly substantial if the
State can point to off-reservation effects that necessitate
State intervention. Cf. Puyallup Tribe v. Washington
Game Dept., supra.
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III
With these principles in mind, we turn to New Mexico's
claim that it may superimpose its own hunting and fishing
regulations on the Mescalero Apache Tribe's regulatory
scheme.
A
It is beyond doubt that the Mescalero Apache Tribe lawfully exercises substantial control over the lands and resources of its reservation, including its wildlife. As noted
above, supra, at k!l-, and as conceded by New Mexico, 19 the
sovereignty retained by the Tribe under the Treaty of 1852
includes its right to regulate the use of its resources by members as well as non-members. In Montana v. United States,
supra, we specifically recognized that tribes in general retain
this authority.
Moreover, this aspect of tribal sovereignty has been expressly confirmed by numerous federal statutes. 20 Pub. L.
280 specifically confirms the power of tribes to regulate onreservation hunting and fishing. 67 Stat. 588, 25 U. S. C.
§ 1321(b); 18 U. S. C. § 1162(b). 21 This authority is afforded

e

19

"

'

New Mexico concedes that the Tribe originally relied on wildlife for

~nee, that tribal members freely took fish and game in ancestral territory, and that the Treaty of July 1, 1852, 10 Stat. 979, between the Tribe
and the United States confirmed the Tribe's rights regarding hunting and
fishing on the small portion of the aboriginal Mescalero domain that was
eventually set apart as the Tribe's reservation. Brief, at 12. See Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U. S. 404 (1968); Montana
v. United States, 450 U. S. 544, 558-559 (1981). See also United States v.
Winans, 198 U. S. 371, 381 (1905)(recognizing that hunting and fishing
"were not much less necessary to the existence of the Indians than the atmosphere they breathed").
20
The Tribe's authority was also confirmed more generally by the Indian
Reorganization Act, 25 U.S. C. §476, which reaffirms "all powers vested
in any Indian tribe or tribal council by existing law."
21
The provision of Pub. L. 280 granting States criminal jurisdiction over
Indian reservations under certain conditions provides that States were not
thereby authorized to

V
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the protection of the federal criminal law by 18 U. S. C.
§ 1165, which makes it a violation of federal law to enter Indian land to hunt, trap or fish without the consent of the
tribe. See Montana v. United States, 450 U. S., at 562 n. ·
11. The 1981 amendments to the Lacey Act, 16 U. S. C.
§ 3371 et seq., further accord tribal hunting and fishing regulations the force of federal law by making it a federal offense
3
to violate "any Indian tribal law." § 3iZ_2(a)(~). 22
B
Several considerations strongly support the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the Tribe's authority to regulate hunting and fishing preempts State jurisdiction. It is important
to emphasize that concurrent jurisdiction would effectively
nullify the Tribe's authority to control hunting and fishing on
the reservation. Concurrent jurisdiction would empower
New Mexico wholly to supplant tribal regulations. The
State would be able to dictate the terms on which nonmembers are permitted to utilize the reservation's resources.
The Tribe would thus exercise its authority over the reservation only at the sufferance of the State. The tribal authority
to regulate hunting and fishing by nonmembers, which has
been repeatedly confirmed by federal treaties and laws and
which we explicitly recognized in montana v. United States,
supra, would have a rather hollow ring if tribal authority
amounted to no more than this.
Furthermore, the exercise of concurrent State jurisdiction
in this case would completely "disturb and disarrange", War"deprive any Indian of any Indian trie, band, or community of any right,
privilege, or immunity afforded under Federal treaty, agreement, or statute with respect to hunting, trapping, or fishing or the control, licensing or
regulation thereof." 18 U. S. C. § 1162(b); 25 U. S. C. § 1321(b) (emphasis
added).
22
Sections 3375(a) and (b) authorize the Secretary to enter into agreements with Indian tribes to enforce the provisions of the law by, inter alia,
making arrests and serving process.

v
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ren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S.
685, 691 (1965), the comprehensive scheme of federal and
tribal management established pursuant to federal law. As
described above, ~' at .J.::L, federal law requires the Sec- ~ )
retary to review each of the Tribe's hunting and fishing ordinances. Those ordinances are based on the recommendations made by a federal range conservationist employed by
the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Moreover, the Bureau of
Sport Fisheries an.d Wildlife stocks the reservation's waters
based on its own determinations concerning the availability of
fish, biological requirements, and the fishing pressure created by on-reservation fishing. App. 71. 23
Concurrent State jurisdiction would supplant this regulatory scheme with an inconsistent dual system: members
would be governed by Tribal ordinances, while nonmembers
would be regulated by general State hunting and fishing
laws. This could severely hinder the ability of the Tribe to
conduct a sound management program. Tribal ordinances
reflect the specific needs of the reservation by establishi_~~
the optimal level of hunting and fishing that should occuzr,
not simply a maximum level that should not be exceeded.
State laws in contrast are based on considerations not necessarily relevant to, and possibly hostile to, the needs of the
reservation. For instance, the ordinance permitting a
hunter to kill a buck and a doe was designed to curb excessive
growth of the deer population on the reservation. App. at
153-154. Enforcement of the State regulation permitting
only buck to be killed would frustrate that objective. Similarly, by determining the Tribal hunting seasons, bag limits,
and permit availability, the Tribe regulates the duration and
intensity of hunting. These determinations take into account numerous factors, including the game capacity of the
terrain, the range utilization of the game animals, and the
In addition, as noted earlier, supra, at 3::¥, the Federal Government
played a substantial role in the development of the Tribe's resources.
28
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availability of tribal personnel to monitor the hunts. Permitting the State to enforce different restrictions simply because
they have been determined to be appropriate for the State as
a whole would impose on the Tribe the possibly insurmountable task of ensuring that the patchwork application of State
and Tribal regulations remains consistent with sound management of the reservation's resources.
Federal law commits to the Secretary and the Tribal Council the responsibility to manage the reservation's resources.
It is most unlikely that Congress would have authorized, and
the Secretary would have established, financed, and participated in Tribal management if it were thought that New
Mexico was free to nullify the entire arrangement. 24 Requiring Tribal ordinances to yield whenever State law is more restrictive would seriously "undermine the Secretary's [and the
Tribe's] ability to make the wide range of determinations
committed to [their] authority." Bracker, supra, at 149.
See Fisher v. District Court, 424 U. S. 382, 390 (1976)(per
curiam); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U. S. 544 (1975). 25
The Secretary assumed precisely the opposite is true-that State jurisdiction is preempted-when he approved a tribal ordinance which provided that nonmembers hunting and fishing on the reservation need not obtain State licenses. That assumption is also embodied in an agreement
between the Tribe and the Department of Interior's Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, see note 7, supra, which openly acknowledges that
tribal regulations need not agree with State laws. The agreement provides that "[i]nsofar as possible said regulations shall be in agreement
with State regulations." (Emphasis added).
26
Congress' intent to preempt State regulation of hunting and fishing on
reservations is reinforced by Pub. L. 280. That law, which grants limited
criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indians reservations to States which
meet certain requirements, contains a provision which expressly excludes
authority over hunting and fishing. That provision provides that a State
which has properly assumed jurisdiction under Pub. L. 280 is not thereby
authorized to
"deprive any Indian of any Indian trie, band, or community of any right,
privilege, or immunity afforded under Federal treaty, agreement, or stat24
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The assertion of concurrent jurisdiction by New Mexico not
only would threaten to disrupt the federal and tribal regulatory scheme, bu~also_ threaten Congress' overriding objec- w o u
tive of encouraging tribal self-government and economic
development. The Tribe has engaged in a concerted and
sustained undertaking to develop and manage the reservation's wildlife and land resources specifically for the benefit of
its members. The project generates funds for essential
tribal services and provides employment for members who
reside on the reservation. This case is thus far removed
from those situations, such as on-reservation sales outlets
which market to nonmembers goods not manufactured by the
tribe or its members, in which the tribal contribution to an
enterprise is de minimis. See Washington v. Confederated
Tribes, 447 U. S. 134, 154-159 (1980). 26 The Tribal enterprise in this case clearly involves "value generated on the reservation by activities involving the Trib[e]." ld., at
156-157. The disruptive effect that would result from the
ute with respect to hunting, trapping, or fishing or the control, licensing or
regulation thereof." 18 U. S. C. § 1162(b); 25 U. S. C. § 1321(b) (emphasis
added).
Pub. L. 280 evidences Congress' understanding that tribal regulation of
hunting and fishing should generally be insulated from State interference,
since "Congress would not have jealously protected" tribal exemption from
conflicting State hunting and fishing laws "had it thought that the States
had residual power to impose such [laws] in any event." McClanahan v.
Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U. S. 164, 177 (1973). In McClanahan we concluded that the Buck Act, 4 U. S. C. § 105 et seq., which contains a provision exempting Indians from a grant to the States of general authority to
tax residents of federal areas, likewise provided evidence of Congress' intent to exempt Indians from State taxes. Ibid.
26
In Washington v. Confederated Tribes the Court held that the sales of
tribal smokeshops which sold cigarettes to nonmembers were subject to
the State sales and cigarette taxes. !d., at 154-159. The Court relied on
the fact that the tribal smokeshops were not marketing "value generated
on the reservation," id., at 156-157, but instead were seeking merely to
market a "tax exemption to nonmembers who do not receive significant
tribal services." Id., at 157.

I

J
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assertion of concurrent jurisdiction by New Mexico would
plainly "stan[d] as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress," Ramah Navajo
School Bd., supra, at--, quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
u. s. 52, 67 (1941).

c

The State has failed to "identify any regulatory function or
service . . . that would justify" the assertion of concurrent
regulatory authority. Bracker, supra, at 148. The hunting
and fishing permitted by the Tribe occurs entirely on the reservation. The fish and wildlife resources are either native to
the reservation or were created by the joint efforts of the
Tribe and the Federal Government. New Mexico does not
contribute in any significant respect to the maintenance of
these resources, and can point to no other "governmental
functions it provides," Ramah Navajo School Bd., supra, at
- - , in connection with hunting and fishing on the reservation by nonmembers that would justify the assertion of its
authority.
The State also cannot point to any off-reservation effects
that warrant State intervention. Some species of game
never leave tribal lands, and the State points to no specific
interest concerning those that occasionally do. Unlike
Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Game Dept., supra, this is
not a case in which a Treaty expressly subjects a tribe's hunting and fishing rights to the common rights of nonmembers
and in which a State's interest in conserving a scarce, common supply justifies State intervention. 433 U. S., at 174,
175-177. The State concedes that the Tribe's management
has not had an adverse impact on fish and wildlife outside the
reservation." Respondent's Brief in Opposition, App. 35a. ?:1
-n we rejct the State's claim that the Tribe's ability to manage its wildlife
resources suffers from a lack of enforcement powers and that therefore
concurrent jurisdiction is necessary to fill the void. The Tribe clearly can
exclude or expel those who violate Tribal ordinances. Trespassers may be
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New Mexico contends that it will be deprived of the sale of
state licenses to nonmembers who hunt and fish on the reservation, as well as some federal matching funds calculated in
part on the basis of the number of State licenses sold. 28
However, the State expressly disavows any reliance on its
taxing powers as the basis for concurrent jurisdiction. It defends the application of its hunting and fishing laws, including
the State's license requirement, solely as a proper exercise of
its regulatory authority, Petitioner's Brief 18 n. 5, and the
State's regulatory interests, as we have indicated, are insignificant. Even if the State's licensing requirement were
properly characterized and defended as an independent taxing measure, the State's financial interests are insufficient to
justify the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction. The loss of
revenues to the State is likely to be insubstantial given the
small numbers of persons who purchase tribal hunting licenses.29 Moreover, as already noted, supra, at LL-,the
State has pointed to no services it has performed in connection with hunting and fishing by nonmembers which justify
imposing a tax in the form of a hunting and fishing license,
Ramaha Navajo School Bd., supra, at--; Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 448 U. S., at 174 (Powreferred for prosecution under 18 U. S. C. § 1165. Furthermore, the
Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, 16 U. S. C. § 3371 et seq., make it a federal offense to violate any tribal law, provide for civil and criminal penalties
and authorizes forfeiture of fish or wildlife as well as vehicles or equipment
used in the violation, §§ 3373, 3374, and provide that the Secretary can
grant authority to tribal personnel to enforce these provisions. § 3375(a),
(b).
28
The State receives federal matching funds through the Pittman-Robinson Act, 16 U. S. C. 669 (hunting), and the Dingle-Johnson Act, 16
U. S. C. 777 (fishing), which are allocated through a formula which considers the number of licenses sold and the number of acres in the State.
29
In recent years the Tribe sold 10 antelope licenses compared to 3,500
for the State, 50 elk licenses compared to 14,000 by the State, and 500 deer
licenses compared to 100,000 for the State.

v
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J., concurring), and its general desire to avoid a loss of
revenues is simply inadequate to justify the assertion of concurrent jurisdiction in this case. See Bracker, 448 U. S., at
150; Ramah Navajo School Bd., supra, at - - . 30
ELL,

IV
In this case the governing body of an Indian Tribe, working closely with the Federal Government and under the authority of federal law, has exercised its lawful authority to
develop and manage the reservation's resources for the benefit of its members. The exercise of concurrent Jurisdiction
by the State would effectively nullify the Tribe's unquestioned authority to regulate the use of its resources by members and nonmembers, interfere with the comprehensive
tribal regulatory scheme, and threaten Congress' firm commitment to the encouragement of tribal self-sufficiency and
economic development. Given the strong interests favoring
exclusive tribal jurisdiction and the absence of State interests
which justify the assertion of concurrent authority, we conclude that the application of the State's hunting and fishing
laws to the reservation is preempted.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Affirmed.

30
New Mexico concedes that it has expended no Dingle-Johnson funds
for projects within the reservation during the last six to eight years. Brf.
in Op. App. 17a-18a. It presented no evidence as to expenditures of
Pittman-Robinson funds within the reservation.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 82-331
NEW MEXICO, ET AL., PETITIONER v.
MESCALERO APACHE TRIBE
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
[June - , 1983]

JUSTICE MARSHALL, delivered j,he opinion of the Court.
We are called upon to decide in this case whether a State
may restrict an Indian Tribe's regulation of hunting and fishing on its reservation. With extensive federal assistance
and supervision, the Mescalero Apache Tribe has established
a comprehensive scheme for managing the reservation's fish
and wildlife resources. Federally approved Tribal ordinances regulate in detail the conditions under which both
members of the Tribe and nonmembers may hunt and fish.
New Mexico seeks to apply its own laws to hunting and fishing by nonmembers on the reservation. We hold that this
application of New Mexico's hunting and fishing laws is preempted by the operation of federal law.
I
The Mescalero Apache Tribe (Tribe) resides on a reservation located within Otero County in south central New
Mexico. The reservation, which represents only a small portion of the aboriginal Mescalero domain, was created by a
succession of Executive Orders promulgated in the 1870's and
1880's. 1 The present reservation comprises more than
' See 1 C. Klapper, Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties 870-873 (1904).
The final boundaries were fixed by the Executive Order of Mar. 24, 1883
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460,000 acres, of which the Tribe owns all but 193.85 acres. 2
Approximately 2,000 members of the Tribe reside on the reservation, along with 179 non-Indians, including resident federal employees of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Indian
Health Service.
The Tribe is organized under the Indian Reorganization
Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984, 25 U. S. C. §461 et seq.,
which authorizes any tribe residing on a reservation to adopt
a constitution and bylaws, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary). The Tribe's Constitution,
which was approved by the Secretary on January 12, 1965,
requires the Tribal Council
"[t]o protect and preserve the property, wildlife and natural resources of the tribe, and to regulate the conduct of
trade and the use and disposition of tribal property upon
the reservation, providing that any ordinance directly affecting non-members of the tribe shall be subject to review by the Secretary of Interior." App. 53.
The Constitution further provides that the Council shall
"adopt and approve plans of operation to govern the conduct of any business or industry that will further the economic well-being of the members of the tribe, and to undertake any activity not inconsistent with Federal law or
(Order of President Arthur). Portions of the reservation were briefly included in a National Forest, but were restored to the Mescalero reservation by the Executive Order of Feb. 17, 1912 (Order of President Taft).
An intervening Executive Order of Mar. 1, 1910, issued by President Taft
exempted from the reservation two "small holdings claims" covering settlements located before the establishment of the reservation. The Tribe has
since purchased all but 23.8 acres of the land covered by these claims.
2
These lands comprise the 23.8 acres remaining of the "small holdings
claims," see note 1, supra; 10 acres granted to St. Joseph's Catholic Church
by the Act of Mar. 29, 1928, ch. 299, 45 Stat. 1716; and the unimproved and
unoccupied 160 acre "Dodson Tract" in the northwest portion of the reservation. See Brief for United States 2 ri. 3:
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with this constitution, designed for the social or economic improvement of the Mescalero Apache people,
... subject to review by the Secretary of the Interior."
Ibid.
Anticipating a decline in the sale of lumber which has been
the largest income-producing activity within the reservation,
the Tribe has recently committed substantial time and resources to the development of other sources of income. The
Tribe has constructed a resort complex financed principally
by federal funds, 3 and has undertaken a substantial development of the reservation's hunting and fishing resources.
These efforts provide employment opportunities for members of the Tribe, and the sale of hunting and fishing licenses
and related services generates income which is used to maintain the Tribal government and provide services to Tribe
members. 4
Development of the reservation's fish and wildlife resources has involved a sustained, cooperative effort by the
Tribe and the Federal Government. Indeed, the reservation's fishing resources are wholly attributable to these recent efforts. Using federal funds, the Tribe has established
Financing for the complex, the Inn of Mountain Gods, came principally
from the Economic Development Administration (EDA), an agency of the
United States Department of Commerce, and other federal sources. In
addition, the Tribe obtained a $6 million loan from the Bank of New Mexico, 90% of which was guaranteed by the Secretary of the Interior under
the Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U. S. C. §§ 1451-1543, and 10% of
which was guaranteed by Tribal funds. Certain additional facilities at the
Inn were completely funded by the EDA as public works projects, and
other facilities received 50% funding from the EDA. Appendix to Brief in
Opposition 7a-8a.
' Income from the sale of hunting and fishing licenses, "package hunts"
which combine hunting and fishing with use of the facilities at the Inn, and
campground and picnicking permits totalled $269,140 in 1976 and $271,520
in 1977. The vast majority of the nonmember hunters and fishermen on
the reservation are not residents of the State of New Mexico.
3
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eight artificial lakes which, together with the reservation's
streams, are stocked by the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and
Wildlife of the the U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior, which operates a federal hatchery located on the reservation. None of the waters are stocked by
the State. 6 The United States has also contributed substantially to the creation of the reservation's game resources.
Prior to 1966 there were only 13 elk in the vicinity of the reservation. In 1966 and 1967 the National Park Service donated a herd of 162 elk which was released on the reservation. Through its management and range development 6 the
Tribe has dramatically increased the elk population, which by
1977 numbered approximately 1,200. New Mexico has not
contributed significantly to the development of the elk herd
or the other game on the reservation, which includes antelope, bear and deer. 7
The Tribe and the Federal Government jointly conduct a
comprehensive fish and game management program. Pursuant to its Constitution and to an agreement with the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, 8 the Tribal Council
adopts hunting and fishing ordinances each year. The tribal
ordinances, which establish bag limits and seasons and provide for licensing of hunting and fishing, are subject to ap5

The State has not stocked any waters on the reservation since 1976.
These efforts have included controlling and reducing the population of
other animals, such as wild horses and cattle, which compete for the available forage on the reservation.
' The New Mexico Department Game and Fish issued a permit for the
importation of the elk from Wyoming into New Mexico. The Department
has provided the Tribe with any management assistance which the Tribe
has requested; such requests have been limited. Appendix to Brief in Opposition 16a.
8
That agreement, which provides for the stocking of the reservation's
artifical lakes by the Bureau, obligates the Tribe to "designate those waters of the reservation which shall be open to public fishing" and "to establish regulations for the conservation of fishery resources." App. 71.
6
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proval by the Secretary under the Tribal Constitution and
have been so approved. The Tribal Council adopts the game
ordinances on the basis of recommendations submitted by a
Bureau of Indian Affairs range conservationist who is assisted by full-time conservation officers employed by the
Tribe. The recommendations are made in light of the conservation needs of the reservation, which are determined on
the basis of annual game counts and surveys. Through the
Bureau of Fish and Wildlife, the Secretary also determines
the stocking of the reservation's waters based upon periodic
surveys of the reservation.
Numerous conflicts exist between State and tribal hunting
regulations. 9 For instance, tribal seasons and bag limits for
both hunting and fishing often do not coincide with those imposed by the State. The Tribe permits a hunter to kill both
a buck and a doe; the State permits only buck to be killed.
Unlike the State, the Tribe permits a person to purchase an
elk license in two consecutive years. Moreover, since 1977,
the Tribe's ordinances have specified that State hunting and
fishing licenses are not required for Indians or non-Indians
who hunt or fish on the reservation. 10 The New Mexico Department of Game and Fish has enforced the State's regulations by arresting non-Indian hunters for illegal possession of
game killed on the reservation in accordance with tribal ordinances but not in accordance with State hunting regulations.
In 1977 the Tribe filed suit against the State and the Director of its Fish and Game Department in the United States
District Court for the District of New Mexico, seeking to prevent the State from regulating on-reservation hunting or
These conflicts have persisted despite the parties' stipulation that the
New Mexico State Game Commission has attempted to "accomodate the
preferences of the Mescalero Apache Tribe and other Indian tribes." Appendix to Brief in Opposition 25a.
10
Prior to 1977 the Tribe consented to the application to the reservation
of the State's hunting and fishing regulations.
9
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fishing by members or nonmembers. On August 2, 1978, the
District Court ruled in favor of the Tribe and granted declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of the
State's hunting and fishing laws against any person for hunting and fishing activities conducted on the reservation. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 630 F. 2d 724 (1980). Following New Mexico's petition for a writ of certiorari, this Court vacated the Tenth
Circuit's judgment, 450 U. S. 1036 (1981), and remanded the
case for reconsideration in light of Montana v. United States,
450 U. S. 544 (1981). On remand, the Court of Appeals adhered to its earlier decision. 677 F. 2d 55 (1982). We
granted certiorari, - - U. S. - - (1982), and we now
affirm.
II
New Mexico concedes that on the reservation the Tribe exercises exclusive jurisdiction over hunting and fishing by
members of the Tribe and may also regulate the hunting and
fishing by nonmembers. 11 New Mexico contends, however,
that it may exercise concurrent jurisdiction over nonmembers and that therefore its regulations governing hunting and
fishing throughout the State should also apply to hunting and
fishing by nonmembers on the reservation. Although New
Mexico does not claim that it can require the Tribe to permit
nonmembers to hunt and fish on the reservation, it claims
that, once the Tribe chooses to permit hunting and fishing by
nonmembers, such hunting and fishing is subject to any
State-imposed conditions. Under this view the State would
be free to impose conditions more restrictive than the Tribe's
own regulations, including an outright prohibition. The
question in this case is whether the State may so restrict the
Tribe's exercise of its authority.
Our decision in Montana v. United States, supra, does not
resolve this question. Unlike this case, Montana concerned
11

Brief for Petitioner 7, 12, 20; Tr. of Oral Arg. 7.
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lands located within the reservation but not owned by the
Tribe or its members. We held that the Crow Tribe could
not as a general matter regulate hunting and fishing on those
lands. 450 U. S., at 557-567. 12 But as to "lands belonging
to the Tribe or held by the United States in trust for the
Tribe," we "readily agree[d]" that a Tribe may "prohibit nonmembers from hunting or fishing . . . [or] condition their
entry by charging a fee or establish bag and creel limits."
Id., at 557. We had no occasion to decide whether a Tribe
may only exercise this authority in a manner permitted by a
State.
On numerous occasions this Court has considered the question whether a State may assert authority over a reservation.
The decision in Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 561 (1832),
reflected the view that Indian tribes were wholly distinct nations within whose boundaries "the laws of [a State] can have
no force." We long ago departed from the "conceptual clarity of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall's view in Worcester," Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S. 145, 148 (1973), and
have acknowledged certain limitations on tribal sovereignty.
For instance, we have held that Indian tribes have been implicitly divested of their sovereignty in certain respects by
virtue of their dependent status, 13 that under certain circumstances a State may validly assert authority over the activi12
Even so, the Court acknowledged that "Indian tribes retain inherent
sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands." 450 U. S., at
565. The Court stressed that in Montana the pleadings "did not allege
that non-Indian hunting and fishing on [non-Indian] reservation lands [had]
impaired [the Tribe's reserved hunting and fishing privileges]," id., at 558
n. 6, or "that non-Indian hunting and fishing on fee lands imperil the subsistence or welfare of the Tribe," id., at 566, and that the existing record
failed to suggested "that such non-Indian hunting and fishing ... threaten
the Tribe's political or economic security." Ibid .
13
See, e. g., Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U. S. 661,
667~68 (1974); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U. S. 191 (1978).
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ties of nonmembers on a reservation, 14 and that in exceptional
circumstances a State may assert jurisdiction over the onreservation activities of tribal members. 15
Nevertheless, in demarcating the respective spheres of
State and tribal authority over Indian reservations, we have
continued to stress that "Indian tribes are unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their
members and their territory," White Mountain Apache Tribe
v. Bracker, 448 U. S. 136, 142 (1980), quoting United States
v. Mazurie, 419 U. S. 544, 557 (1975). Because of their sovereign status, tribes and their reservation lands are insulated
by an "historic immunity from state and local control," Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S. 145, 152 (1973), and
tribes retain any aspect of their historical sovereignty not
"inconsistent with the overriding interests of the National
Government." Washington v. Confederated Tribes, supra,
at 153.
The sovereignty retained by tribes includes "the power of
regulating their internal and social relations," United States
v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375, 381-382 (1886), cited in United
States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S. 313, 322 (1978). A tribe's
power to presribe the conduct of tribal members has never
been doubted, and our cases establish that a State may not
assert its authority over the activities of members on a resSee, e. g., Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134 (1980);
Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U. S. 463 (1976).
15
See Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Game Dept., 433 U.S. 165 (1977).
Puyallup upheld the State of Washington's authority to regulate on-reservation fishing by tribal members. Like Montana v. United States,
supra, the decision in Puyallup rested in part on the fact that the dispute
centered on lands which, although located within the reservation boundaries, no longer belonged to the tribe; all but 22 of the 18,000 acres had
been alienated in fee simple. The Court also relied on a provision of the
Indian treaty which qualified the Indians' fishing rights by requiring that
they be exercised "in common with all citizens of the Territory," id., 175,
and on the State's interest in conserving a scarce, common resource.
Id., at 174, 17&-177.
14
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ervation in the absence of express tribal consent or congressional grant. See Fisher v. District Court, 424 U. S. 382,
388-389 (1976) (per curiam); McClanahan v. Arizona State
Tax Comm'n, 411 U. S. 164, 171 (1973); Mescalero Apache
Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S. 145, 148 (1973). See also Williams
v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217, 222 (1959).
A tribe's power to exclude nonmembers entirely or to condition their presence on the reservation is equally well
established. See, e. g., Montana v. United States, supra;
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U. S. 130 (1982).
Whether a State may also assert its authority over the onreservation activities of nonmembers raises "[m]ore difficult
questions," Bracker, supra, at 144. While under some circumstances a State may exercise concurrent jurisdiction over
non-Indians acting on tribal reservations, see, e. g., Washington v. Confederated Tribes, supra; Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U. S. 463 (1976), such authority may be asserted only if not preempted by the operation of federal law.
See, e. g., Ramah Navajo School Bd., supra; White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, supra; Central Machinery Co.
v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 448 U. S. 160 (1980); Williams v.
Lee, 358 U. S. 217 (1959); Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U. S. 685 (1965); Fisher v. District
Court, supra; Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, 400
u. s. 423 (1971).
In Bracker we reviewed our prior decisions concerning
tribal and State authority over Indian reservations and
extracted certain principles governing the determination
whether federal law preempts the assertion of State authority over nonmembers on a reservation. We stated that that
determination does not depend "on mechanical or absolute
conceptions of state or tribal sovereignty, but calls for a particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and
tribal interests at stake." 448 U. S., at 145.
We also emphasized the special sense in which the doctrine
of preemption is applied in this context. See id., at 143-144;
Ramah Navajo School Bd., supra,-- U. S., at--. Al-
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though a State will certainly be without jurisdiction if its authority is preempted under familiar principles of preemption,
we cautioned that our prior cases did not limit preemption of
State laws affecting Indian tribes to only those circumstances. "The unique historical origins of tribal sovereignty" and the federal commitment to tribal self-sufficiency
and self-determination make it "treacherous to import . . .
notions of preemption that are properly applied to other contexts." Bracker, supra, at 143. See also Ramah Navajo
School Bd., supra, at - - . By resting preemption analysis
principally on a consideration of the nature of the competing
interests at stake, our cases have rejected a narrow focus on
congressional intent to preempt State law as the sole touchstone. They have also rejected the proposition that preemption requires "an express congressional statement to that effect." Bracker, supra, at 144 (footnote omitted). State
jurisdiction is preempted by the operation of federal law if it
interferes or is incompatible with federal and tribal interests
reflected in federal law, unless the State interests at stake
are sufficient to justify the assertion of State authority.
Bracker, supra, at 145. See also Ramah Navajo School
Bd., supra, at--, quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S.
52, 67 (1941). 16
Certain broad considerations guide our assessment of the
federal and tribal interests. The traditional notions of Indian sovereignty provide a crucial "backdrop," Bracker,
supra, at 143, citing McClanahan, supra, at 172, against
which any assertion of State authority must be assessed.
6
' The exercise of State authority may also be barred by an independent
barrier-inherent tribal sovereignty-if it "unlawfully infringe[s] 'on the
right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them."
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U. S., at 142, quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217, 220 (1959). See also Washington v. Yakima
Indian Nation, 439 U. S. 463, 502 (1979); Fisher v. District Court, 424
U. S. 382 (1976) (per curiam); Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, 400
U. S. 423 (1971)." 448 U. S., at 142-143.
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Moreover, both the tribes and the Federal Government are
firmly committed to the goal of promoting tribal self-government, a goal embodied in numerous federal statutes. 17 We
have stressed that Congress' objective of furthering tribal
self-government encompasses far more than encouraging
tribal management of disputes between members, but ineludes Congress' overriding goal of encouraging "tribal self- (
sufficiency and economic development." Bracker, supra, at
143 (footnote omitted). In part as a necessary implication of
this broad federal commitment, we have held that tribes have
the power to manage the use of its territory and resources by
both members and nonmembers, 18 Merrion, supra, at 137;
Bracker, supra, at 151; Montana v. United States, supra; 28
U. 8. C. § 1162(b); 25 U. 8. C. §§ 1321(b), 1322(b); 18
17
For example, the Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U. S. C. § 1451 et
seq., states: "It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress ... to help
develop and utilize Indian resources, both physical and human, to a point
where the Indians will fully exercise responsibility for the utilization and
management of their own resources and where they will enjoy a standard
of living from their own productive efforts comparable to that enjoyed by
non-Indians in neighboring communities." § 1451. Similar policies underlie the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, 25
U. S. C. § 450 et seq., as well as the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25
U.S. C. §461 et seq., pursuant to which the Mescalero Apache Tribe
adopted its Constitution. The "intent and purpose of the Reorganization
Act was 'to rehabilitate the Indian's economic life and to give him a chance
to develop the initiative destroyed by a century of oppression and paternalism."' Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S., at 152, quoting H. R.
Rep. No. 1804, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1934). The Indian Civil Rights Act
of 1968, 25 U. S. C. § 1301 et seq., likewise reflects Congress' intent "to
promote the well-established federal 'policy of furthering Indian selfgovernment."' Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U. S. 49, 62 (1978),
quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 551 (1974).
8
' Our cases have recognized that tribal sovereignty contains a "significant geographical component." Bracker, supra, at 151. Thus the offreservation activities of Indians are generally subject to the prescriptions
of a "nondiscriminatory state law" in the absence of "express federal law to
the contrary." Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S., at 148-149.
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U. S. C. § 1165, to undertake and regulate economic activity
within the reservation, Merrion, supra, at 137, and to defray
the cost of governmental services by levying taxes. Ibid.
Thus, when a tribe undertakes an enterprise under the authority i federallaw, an assertion of State authority is preempted fit threatens to interfere with the successful accomplishmen of the federal purpose. See generally Bracker,
supra, at 143 (footnote omitted), Ramah Navajo School Bd.,
supra, at--, quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67
(1941) (State authority precluded when it "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress").
Our prior decisions also guides our assessment of the state
interest asserted to justify State jurisdiction over a reservation. The exercise of State authority which imposes additional burdens on a tribal enterprise must ordinarily be justified by functions or services performed by the State in
connection with the on-reservation activity. Ramah Navajo
School Bd., supra, a t - - and note 7; Bracker, supra, at
148-149; Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n,
448 U. S. 160, 174 (1980) (POWELL, J., concurring). Thus a
State seeking to impose a tax on a transaction between a
Tribe and nonmembers must point to more than its general
interest in raising revenues. See, e. g., Warren Trading
Post Co., supra; Bracker, supra; Ramah Navajo School Bd.,
supra. A State's regulatory interest will be particularly
substantial if the State can point to off-reservation effects
that necessitate State intervention. Cf. Puyallup Tribe v.
Washington Game Dept. , supra.

III
With these principles in mind, we turn to New Mexico's
claim that it may superimpose its own hunting and fishing
regulations on the Mescalero Apache Tribe's regulatory
scheme.
A

It is beyond doubt that the Mescalero Apache Tribe law-
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fully exercises substantial control over the lands and resources of its reservation, including its wildlife. As noted
above, supra, at 6--7, and as conceded by New Mexico/9 the
sovereignty retained by the Tribe under the Treaty of 1852
includes its right to regulate the use of its resources by members as well as non-members. In Montana v. United States,
supra, we specifically recognized that tribes in general retain
this authority.
Moreover, this aspect of tribal sovereignty has been expressly confirmed by numerous federal statutes. 20 Pub. L.
280 specifically confirms the power of tribes to regulate onreservation hunting and fishing. 67 Stat. 588, 25 U. S. C.
§ 1321(b); 18 U. S. C. § 1162(b). 21 This authority is afforded
the protection of the federal criminal law by 18 U. S. C.
§ 1165, which makes it a violation of federal law to enter InNew Mexico concedes that the Tribe originally relied on wildlife for
subsistence, that tribal members freely took fish and game in ancestral
territory, and that the Treaty of July 1, 1852, 10 Stat. 979, between the
Tribe and the United States confirmed the Tribe's rights regarding hunting and fishing on the small portion of the aboriginal Mescalero domain that
was eventually set apart as the Tribe's reservation. Brief, at 12. See
Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U. S. 404 (1968); Montana v. United States, 450 U. S. 544, 55~59 (1981). See also United
States v. Winans, 198 U. S. 371, 381 (1905) (recognizing that hunting and
fishing "were not much less necessary to the existence of the Indians than
the atmosphere they breathed").
ro The Tribe's authority was also confirmed more generally by the Indian
Reorganization Act, 25 U. S. C. § 476, which reaffirms "all powers vested
in any Indian tribe or tribal council by existing law."
21
The provision of Pub. L. 280 granting States criminal jurisdiction over
Indian reservations under certain conditions provides that States were not
thereby authorized to
"deprive any Indian of any Indian tribe, band, or community of any right,
privilege, or immunity afforded under Federal treaty, agreement, or statute with respect to hunting, trapping, or fishing or the control, licensing or
regulation thereof." 18 U. S. C. § 1162(b); 25 U. S. C. § 1321(b) (emphasis
added).
19
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dian land to hunt, trap or fish without the consent of the
tribe. See Montana v. United States, 450 U. S., at 562 n.
11. The 1981 amendments to the Lacey Act, 16 U. S. C.
§ 3371 et seq., further accord tribal hunting and fishing regulations the force of federal law by making it a federal offense
"to import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or purchase any fish or wildlife . . . taken or possessed in violation
of any ... Indian tribal law." § 3372(a)(1).22
B
Several considerations strongly support the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the Tribe's authority to regulate hunting and fishing preempts State jurisdiction. It is important
to emphasize that concurrent jurisdiction would effectively
nullify the Tribe's authority to control hunting and fishing on
the reservation. Concurrent jurisdiction would empower
New Mexico wholly to supplant tribal regulations. The
State would be able to dictate the terms on which nonmembers are permitted to utilize the reservation's resources.
The Tribe would thus exercise its authority over the reservation only at the sufferance of the State. The tribal authority
to regulate hunting and fishing by nonmembers, which has
been repeatedly confirmed by federal treaties and laws and
which we explicitly recognized in Montana v. United States,
supra, would have a rather hollow ring if tribal authority
amounted to no more than this.
Furthermore, the exercise of concurrent State jurisdiction
in this case would completely "disturb and disarrange", Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U. S.
685, 691 (1965), the comprehensive scheme of federal and
tribal management established pursuant to federal law. As
described above, supra, at 2-3, federal law requires the Sec22

Sections 3375(a) and (b) authorize the Secretary to enter into agreements with Indian tribes to enforce the provisions of the law by, inter alia,
making arrests and serving process.
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retary to review each of the Tribe's hunting and fishing ordinances. Those ordinances are based on the recommendations made by a federal range conservationist employed by
the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Moreover, the Bureau of
Sport Fisheries and Wildlife stocks the reservation's waters
based on its own determinations concerning the availability of
fish, biological requirements, and the fishing pressure created by on-reservation fishing. App. 71. 23
Concurrent State jurisdiction would supplant this regulatory scheme with an inconsistent dual system: members
would be governed by Tribal ordinances, while nonmembers
would be regulated by general State hunting and fishing
laws. This could severely hinder the ability of the Tribe to
conduct a sound management program. Tribal ordinances
reflect the specific needs of the reservation by establishing
the optimal level of hunting and fishing that should occur, not
simply a maximum level that should not be exceeded. State
laws in contrast are based on considerations not necessarily
relevant to, and possibly hostile to, the needs of the reservation. For instance, the ordinance permitting a hunter to kill
a buck and a doe was designed to curb excessive growth of
the deer population on the reservation. App. at 153-154.
Enforcement of the State regulation permitting only buck to
be killed would frustrate that objective. Similarly, by determining the Tribal hunting seasons, bag limits, and permit
availability, the Tribe regulates the duration and intensity of
hunting. These determinations take into account numerous
factors, including the game capacity of the terrain, the range
utilization of the game animals, and the availability of tribal
personnel to monitor the hunts. Permitting the State to enforce different restrictions simply because they have been determined to be appropriate for the State as a whole would impose on the Tribe the possibly insurmountable task of
23
In addition, as noted earlier, supra, at 3-4, the Federal Government
played a substantial role in the development of the Tribe's resources.

82-331-0PINION
16

NEW MEXICO v. MESCALERO APACHE TRIBE

ensuring that the patchwork application of State and Tribal
regulations remains consistent with sound management of
the reservation's resources.
Federal law commits to the Secretary and the Tribal Council the responsibility to manage the reservation's resources.
It is most unlikely that Congress would have authorized, and
the Secretary would have established, financed, and participated in Tribal management if it were thought that New
Mexico was free to nullify the entire arrangement. 24 Requiring Tribal ordinances to yield whenever State law is more restrictive would seriously "undermine the Secretary's [and the
Tribe's] ability to make the wide range of determinations
committed to [their] authority." Bracker, supra, at 149.
See Fisher v. District Court, 424 U. S. 382, 390 (1976) (per
curiam); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U. S. 544 (1975). 25
24
The Secretary assumed precisely the opposite is true-that State jurisdiction is preempted-when he approved a tribal ordina~ce which provided that nonmembers hunting and fishing on the reservation need not
obtain State licenses. That assumption is also embodied in an agreement
between the Tribe and the Department of Interior's Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, see note 7, supra, which openly acknowledges that
tribal regulations need not agree with State laws. The agreement provides that "{i]nsofar as possible said regulations shall be in agreement
with State regulations." (Emphasis added).
20
Congress' intent to preempt State regulation of hunting and fishing on
reservations is reinforced by Pub. L. 280. That law, which grants limited
criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indians reservations to States which
meet certain requirements, contains a provision which expressly excludes
authority over hunting and fishing. That provision provides that a State
which has properly assumed jurisdiction under Pub. L. 280 is not thereby
authorized to
"deprive any Indian of any Indian tribe, band, or community of any right,
privilege, or immunity afforded under Federal treaty, agreement, or statute with respect to hunting, trapping, or fishing or the control, licensing or
regulation thereof." 18 U. S. C. § 1162(b); 25 U. S. C. § 1321(b) (emphasis
added).
Pub. L. 280 evidences Congress' understanding that tribal regulation of
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The assertion of concurrent jurisdiction by New Mexico not
only would threaten to disrupt the federal and tribal regulatory scheme, but would also threaten Congress' overriding
objective of encouraging tribal self-government and economic
development. The Tribe has engaged in a concerted and
sustained undertaking to develop and manage the reservation's wildlife and land resources specifically for the benefit of
its members. The project generates funds for essential
tribal services and provides employment for members who
reside on the reservation. This case is thus far removed
from those situations, such as on-reservation sales outlets
which market to nonmembers goods not manufactured by the
tribe or its members, in which the tribal contribution to an
enterprise is de minimis. See Washington v. Confederated
Tribes, 447 U. S. 134, 154-159 (1980). 26 The Tribal enterprise in this case clearly involves "value generated on the reservation by activities involving the Trib[e]." /d., at
156-157. The disruptive effect that would result from the
assertion of concurrent jurisdiction by New Mexico would
plainly "stan[d] as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the
hunting and fishing should generally be insulated from State interference,
since "Congress would not have jealously protected" tribal exemption from
conflicting State hunting and fishing laws "had it thought that the States
had residual power to impose such [laws] in any event." McClanahan v.
Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U. S. 164, 177 (1973). In McClanahan we concluded that the Buck Act, 4 U. S. C. § 105 et seq., which contains a provision exempting Indians from a grant to the States of general authority to
tax residents of federal areas, likewise provided evidence of Congress' intent to exempt Indians from State taxes. Ibid.
26
In Washington v. Confederated Tribes the Court held that the sales of
tribal smokeshops which sold cigarettes to nonmembers were subject to
the State sales and cigarette taxes. Id., at 154-159. The Court relied on
the fact that the tribal smokeshops were not marketing "value generated
on the reservation," id., at 15~157, but instead were seeking merely to
market a "tax exemption to nonmembers who do not receive significant
tribal services." Id., at 157.
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full purposes and objectives of Congress," Ramah Navajo
School Bd., supra, at--, quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
u. s. 52, 67 (1941).

c

The State has failed to "identify any regulatory function or
service . . . that would justify" the assertion of concurrent
regulatory authority. Bracker, supra, at 148. The hunting
and fishing permitted by the Tribe occur entirely on the reservation. The fish and wildlife resources are either native to
the reservation or were created by the joint efforts of the
Tribe and the Federal Government. New Mexico does not
contribute in any significant respect to the maintenance of
these resources, and can point to no other "governmental
functions it provides," Ramah Navajo School Bd., supra, at
- - , in connection with hunting and fishing on the reservation by nonmembers that would justify the assertion of its
authority.
The State also cannot point to any off-reservation effects
that warrant State intervention. Some species of game
never leave tribal lands, and the State points to no specific
interest concerning those that occasionally do. Unlike
Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Game Dept., supra, this is
not a case in which a Treaty expressly subiects a tribe's hunting and fishing rights to the common rights of nonmembers
and in which a State's interest in conserving a scarce, common supply justifies State intervention. 433 U. S., at 174,
175--177. The State concedes that the Tribe's management
has not had an adverse impact on fish and wildlife outside the
reservation." Appendix to Brief in Opposition 35a.-n
-nwe reject the State's claim that the Tribe's ability to manage its wildlife resources suffers from a lack of enforcement powers and that therefore
concurrent jurisdiction is necessary to fill the void. The Tribe clearly can
exclude or expel those who violate Tribal ordinances. Trespassers may be
referred for prosecution under 18 U. S. C. § 1165. Furthermore, the
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New Mexico contends that it will be deprived of the sale of
state licenses to nonmembers who hunt and fish on the reservation, as well as some federal matching funds calculated in
part on the basis of the number of State licenses sold. 28
However, the State expressly disavows any reliance on its
taxing powers as the basis for concurrent jurisdiction. It defends the application of its hunting and fishing laws, including
the State's license requirement, solely as a proper exercise of
its regulatory authority, Petitioner's Brief 18 n. 5, and the
State's regulatory interests, as we have indicated, are insignificant. Even if the State's licensing requirement were
properly characterized and defended as an independent taxing measure, the State's financial interests are insufficient to
justify the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction. The loss of
revenues to the State is likely to be insubstantial given the
small numbers of persons who purchase tribal hunting licenses.29 Moreover, as already noted, supra, at 18,the
State has pointed to no services it has performed in connection with hunting and fishing by nonmembers which justify
imposing a tax in the form of a hunting and fishing license, Ramaha Navajo School Bd., supra, at--; Central
Machinery Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 448 U. S., at 174
Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, 16 U. S. C. § 3371 et seq., make it a federal offense to violate any tribal law, provide for civil and criminal penalties and authorizes forfeiture of fish or wildlife as well as vehicles or
equipment used in the violation, §§ 3373, 3374, and provide that the Secretary can grant authority to tribal personnel to enforce these provisions.
§ 3375(a), (b).
28
The State receives federal matching funds through the PittmanRobinson Act, 16 U. S. C. 669 (hunting), and the Dingle.Johnson Act, 16
U. S. C. 777 (fishing), which are allocated through a formula which considers the number of licenses sold and the number of acres in the State.
29
In recent years the Tribe sold 10 antelope licenses compared to 3,500
for the State, 50 elk licenses compared to 14,000 by the State, and 500 deer
licenses compared to 100,000 for the State.
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(POWELL, J., concurring), and its general desire to obtain
revenues is simply inadequate to justify the assertion of concurrent jurisdiction in this case. See Bracker, supra, at 150;
Ramah Navajo School Bd., supra, at - - . 30

IV
In this case the governing body of an Indian Tribe, working closely with the Federal Government and under the authority of federal law, has exercised its lawful authority to
develop and manage the reservation's resources for the benefit of its members. The exercise of concurrent jurisdiction
by the State would effectively nullify the Tribe's unquestioned authority to regulate the use of its resources by members and nonmembers, interfere with the comprehensive
tribal regulatory scheme, and threaten Congress' firm commitment to the encouragement of tribal self-sufficiency and
economic development. Given the strong interests favoring
exclusive tribal jurisdiction and the absence of State interests
which justify the assertion of concurrent authority, we conclude that the application of the State's hunting and fishing
laws to the reservation is preempted.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Affirmed.

New Mexico concedes that it has expended no Dingle..J ohnson funds
for projects within the reservation during the last six to eight years. Appendix to Br. in Opposition 17a-18a. It presented no evidence as to expenditures of Pittman-Robinson funds within the reservation.
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Re:

11, 1983

New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, No. 82-231

Dear Thurgood,
I am essentially in agreement with both the result and
your approach in this case.
As I mentioned to you in my earlier letter, I am having
some difficulty with certain portions of your proposed
opinion due to my hope that it can be compatible with my
draft opinion in Rice v. Rehner. My specific problems are
these:
1. On page 8, in the first full paragraph, you quote
Mescalero and Confederated Tribes for the proposition that
Indians on reservations have been historically immune from
all state control, and that they retain this immunity
insofar as it is consistent with federal objectives. I
think it would be more accurate to say that "Because of
their sovereign status, tribes and their reservation lands
have, in some circumstances, possessed 'historic immunity
from state and local control,' • • • • " This would avoid
conveying the impression that Indians have enjoyed a
tradition of immunity from state law in all areas.
2. Also on page 8, in the second full paragraph going
over to page 9, you state that "our cases establish that a
State may not assert its authority over the activities of
members on a reservation in the absence of express tribal
consent or congressional grant." Again, I think that this
statement would be more accurate if it were to read: "our
cases establish that where there is a tradition of tribal
sovereign immunity, the State • • • • "
.~

......,

2.

3. On page 12, in the carryover paragraph, you state:
"Thus, when a tribe undertakes an enterprise under the
authority of federal law, an assertion of State authority is
preempted to the extent that it 'threaten[s] the overriding
federal objective' of promoting 'tribal self-sufficiency and
economic development.'" I think the implication of this
statement is too broad and contrary to the balancing
structure for preemption analysis established in Bracker.
The statement suggests that anytime state authority ·
threatens the federal policy in favor of Indian economic
self-development, state regulation is preempted. To me this
is contrary to the spirit of Bracker. The threat to a
federal policy is only one factor to be considered. There
is no preemption "to the extent" there is a threat, as the
opinion suggests. In short, some financial burdens imposed
by state regulation may be perfectly permissible depending
on the outcome of balancing federal and tribal interests
against state interests. I suggest that the sentence be
changed to read:
"Thus, when a tribe undertakes an
enterprise under the authority of federal law, an assertion
of State authority must be weighed against any threat to an
"overriding federal objective" of promoting "tribal selfsufficiency."

..
4

4. Also on page 12, in the first full paragraph, you
suggest that when a State seeks to impose additional burdens
on a tribal enterprise, it must ordinarily justify those
burdens by performance of services.
I think that it would
be appropriate to mention in this context our decisions in
Confederated Tribes and Moe, which held that the State may
tax certain on-reservation transactions, and may impose
burdens on Indian businesses to aid in collecting and
enforcing that tax.
5. Also on page 12, in the first full paragraph, you
state: "A State seeking not merely to tax but to regulate a
tribal activity is under a greater burden to advance a
significant State interest, since duplicative and
potentially conflicting regulation is generally more
disruptive than double taxation." As far as I know, we have
never required that States advance a "significant interest"
in order to impose a regulation when non-members are
involved, · or where there is no tradition of tribal immunity.
Perhaps this sentence could be changed to read:
"When a
State seeks to regulate traditionally immune transactions
between tribal members pn a reservation, the State must have
a significant interest in order to impose the regulation."

.

3.

6. On page 19, you suggest that even if the State
sought to characterize the licensing requirement as a tax,
"the State's financial interests are insufficient to justify
the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction." As you
acknowledge, the State defends the licensing requirement
only as a proper exercise of its regulatory power. I see no
reason to discuss what wou~d happen if the State
characterized the requirement here as a proper tax measure.
Moreover, I would prefer to avoid any suggestion that the
tribes have a sovereign interest in sales of "hunting
packages" to non-members of the tribe for purposes of state
taxation of those "packages." That would seem to create a
tension with our decisions in Confederated Tribes and Moe.
I think none of the suggested changes would alter your
essential approach and if you could accommodate these
concerns, I would be happy to join your opinion.

Sincerely,

Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference
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Dear Thurgood:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference

..

::-;'' '

<!J4lttrl of tqt %tilt~ .§taitg
'JITilllfri:ngLrn, ~. <q. 2llgiJt.;l

.§u.prttttt

CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE
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Dear Thurgood:
I join.
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Dear Thurgood,
Please join me in your third
circulation.
Sincerely,

Justice Marshall
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Dear Thurgood,
Thank you for accommodating my suggestions in order to
remove any inconsistency with Rice v. Rehner, No. 82-401.
Please join me.
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Justice Marshall
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